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Abstract
In the Community Health Workers settings in Guinea-Bissau, we explore several
determinants of performance. Firstly, we investigate the effect of socio-demographic
characteristics like education, gender, wealth, job status and community "embededdness".
We provide evidence for significant differences due to education, gender or job status
and community interaction. We also research on the relation between motivation and
performance, concluding extrinsically motivated agents perform better, as opposed to agents
with stronger antisocial impact perceptions, who perform worse.
Given the richness of our data, we also explore differences in ethnicity in terms of
performance outcomes or motivation orientations, but in both cases we find few significant
results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Community health care workers programs start to be widespread in 1980s’ in many developing countries,
as a powerful tool to address difficulties in access to the health care. Historically, those programs are not
a "panacea" in solving serious deficiencies of the health system, nor particularly cheap to implement
[33]. Agents are usually active members of their community, in many cases selected by the community
and integrated into the Health Sector. They often have poor levels of education attainment even if their
work scope is quite large, causing multi-tasking problems: if they provide monthly visits in which they
disseminate health knowledge (pathologies symptoms and therapy, babies and child care, nutrition,
family planning) as a standard service, they usually have context-specific additional tasks to implement.
Their role is particularly important because of their closeness to the demand side of the market, even if
services they provide rarely have substantial health impact and sometimes lack in terms of quality. The
Development Economics literature has focused on studying Community health care programs with the
clear intent to design incentives schemes that fostered self-sustainability and long term effectiveness,
measuring their impact on job performance. Another stream of literature analyzed the relation between
job outcomes and agent-specific aspects like motivation or socio-demographic characteristics.
In this study, we want to conduct an empirical research on which factor is the crucial determinant
of performance in the Guinea-Bissau Community Health Care context, looking at socio-demographic
features and motivation orientations, but also expanding on sociocultural factors such as the ethnic
group. We propose to empirically test motivation theories that have found scarce empirical confirmation
and application in developing countries settings. In addition, given the unique social and cultural
environment in Guinea-Bissau, in which exist among 27 and 40 ethnicities (25 in our dataset) with
specific geographic and historical origins, we research on ethnic groups differences. Another clear intent
is to provide a first evaluation of the Community Health Care program in SAB (Autonomous Sector
of Bissau), 12 months after the beginning of the program, combining data from NOVAFRICA baseline
survey for the project “Impact Evaluation of Different Incentive Systems for Community Health Agents in
Guinea-Bissau” with administrative data on Agents’ performance, specifically researching:
1) What are the community health care workers’ socio-demographic and economic features that
correlate with performance;
2) How motivation can explain performance in our settings;
3) How motivation differs across agents and sub-populations;
4) Whether if ethnicities are so different in terms of motivation or performance.
Using simple OLS and probit models with performance as dependent variable, we find age, sex,
employment status, motivation and community involvement are potential determinants. However,
2
we conclude motivation also differs by socio-demographic or cultural characteristics.
1.1. BACKGROUND
The Health sector in Guinea-Bissau was facing problems of access to health facilities and shortage of
workforce, when the MINSAP (National Health Ministry) decided to introduce 1042 agents on Bissau
territory1. The implementation of the program was assigned to NGO VIDA, the organization that already
implemented a similar project in more peripheral regions of the country, Cacheu and Biombo, since 2012.
The program rose with the clear intent to decrease infant mortality, which has a dramatic incidence on
Guinea-Bissau’s population, but also helping pregnant women during childbearing, birth and the first
years of their offspring’ life. A report by INE (The National Institute of Statistics) and UNICEF in 2014
[35] found out live-born children had 36 percent probability of dying during their first month, 55 percent
until the first 12 months or 89 percent of not reaching their fifth year of life. Despite this statistic, children
mortality rate has been improving in the last years. Other widespread problems in Guinea-Bissau context
are insufficient nutrition, lack of access to improved water or early childbearing [35]. Instead, pneumonia,
diarrhoea and malaria are the pathologies that mostly affect the population.
In our context, agents have been recruited with a minimum requirement of education, and receive
periodical training on safe health practices and health education, together with frequent support and
supervision by VIDA Supervisors. Agents are given the practical task to learn and then teach 16 Essential
Family Practices (now reduced to 15), which involve basic hygiene behaviors that do not require significant
costs but can strongly change health conditions of the population. Assigning to each agent about 50
families in the neighbourhood, the program had the very ambitious objective to cover 54,000 family
nucleus, with an estimate of 385,000 beneficiaries.
The program opened for volunteers, who received a small financial incentive to cover basic expenses
(about 6,000 FCFA, less than 10 euros per month), thus posing the challenge to find tools to monitor
workers’ performance, but also adequate policies to boost their motivation and avoid massive drop-out
rates. Monitoring duties were assigned to 24 Supervisores Operacionais de Terreno (SOT), in charge of
connecting health agents and the implementing organization.
The paper is structured as follows: the second section contains a literature review on motivation and
community health care workers (CHW), the third contains descriptive statistics of the baseline survey.
The fourth section describes the methodology of our research. The fifth presents main results, the sixth
explore determinants of motivation. The sixth part discusses findings and give policy recommendations
and section seven concludes.
1Only 1012 Community Health Care Agents are included in this study.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
It is relevant to study Community Health Care Workers characteristics, behavior and motivation in
order to better design any CHW programs. We are interested to study how those aspects might affect
performance. As Grant [18] suggested, performance might depend on a series of factors, among which
we can identify motivation, opportunity or ability. Motivation might weakly determine performance, in
contexts in which the last two variables have a large scope.
In the Community Health Workers literature, scholars conclude performance might have different
drivers. Glenton [16] claims programs should try to understand CHWs expectations and motives,
attempting to match those with context-specific incentives. A recent literature which takes from
psychology studies the orientations of motivation and the effects of incentives schemes. Firstly, pioneer
studies distinguish between intrinsic motivation, defined as the propensity to act due to the challenge
incorporated in a certain activity, as opposed to extrinsic motivation, which is defined as maintaining a
certain behaviour because of the external outcomes that comes as a consequence of the action: a reward
or external pressure. Other scholars have identified pro-social motivation, meaning the desire to benefit
other people, as another strong motivation factor, different from intrinsic motivation ([24], [34] [40],
[47]). Incentives for the provision of such public goods appear crucial: Ashraf [2] concludes in Zambia
context non-financial rewards leverage on agents’ pro-social motivation, rather Besley [3] adds to the
discussion non-selfish motivation and financial incentives are often substitutes, implying a limited scope
for monetary incentives. Bhattacharyya [4] shows how payments are usually not sustainable, difficult to
increment, create inequity, hence concluding "in-kind payments" are more desirable policies. Kok [28]
partially disagrees, arguing in certain contexts lack of financial incentives for CHWs might be problematic
in terms of performance, and, especially in poor zones, raise ethical issues, preventing people the access
to health care.
Besides personal motives, Cambell et al. [7] suggest the importance of specific external processes:
selection, supervision, training, incentive structures and "community embeddedness" [7] can drastically
affect performance. In Kambarami’s [26] study, positive feedback from supervisors and the community
were associated with improved performance. Haines et al., [22] also suggest the importance of selection
criteria for performance.
Contrarily to the literature on motivation, it is not equally developed research that relates motivation
or performance to distinctive characteristics of the workers, such as socio-economic and demographic
specificities. If we look at the work done by Greenspan [21], aggregate socio-economic factors can be
classified in four categories: individual, family, community, and organizational factors. Motivation factors
can be the social environment [39], the economy, environment, and health system policy [29]. A recent
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paper by Murayama [36] argues cultural identity and ethnicity might influence performance, through the
interaction between program provider and recipient.
Narrowing in the literature on socio-economic characteristics ([45], [28], [26], [27], [32] [6]), we
acknowledge scholars recommend to research the relationship between motivation and characteristics
like experience, education, language, gender, age, and marital status [27] [26]. Kambarami [26] includes
financial incentives and job tenure, meanwhile other scholars identify visual means like bags and T-Shirts
[22], better sanitation practices or longer work experience [26], [27]. Also wealth can be a performance
determinant [30] [1]: in Bangladesh setting wealthier people showed increased drop-out rates [1].
On top of that, other empirical works [27] conclude older CHWs significantly show better performance
levels or decreased drop-out rates [9]. Olang’o [38] reports older CHWs could get help from their
sons in home duties. The author [4] expands that some cultures give greater importance on personal
characteristics such as age, rather than achievements like training or education levels, thus older CHWs
may be more respected by the community. Lehmann et al. [33] argue many CHW programs described in
the literature require a certain education level as application pre-requisite. In some cases, more education
corresponds to improved performance [27]. However, CHWs with higher educational qualifications may
have better opportunities for alternative employment [6], leaving the program. In Bangladesh setting
[1], those who are more educated are found more likely to drop-out. In Kenyan context [38], alternative
job duties contributed to CHW drop-out, because of reduced spare time. On the other hand, gender
can influence performance: in Kambarami [26] paper, female CHWs make more pregnancy referrals,
compared to male CHWs. The author argues women are more likely to disclose a sensitive topic to the
same sex. In Kenya, females CHWs, compared to men, are more likely to convince their clients to adopt
maternal care practice [9]). However, either only women CHW programs or tasks differentiation by gender
may reinforce conservative gender norms, rather than promoting gender equity [14]. For Feldhaus [14]
and Steege [42], current policy design methods in health sector are implicitly tailored to male norms.
Especially husband resistance may be a barrier to women participation [6].
By contrast, in other works [17], [37],[14],[32],[25] socio-economic characteristics are found to be
non-significant determinants of performance. It seems very reliable the conclusion by Kambarami [26],
who suggests there is no consensus in the literature regarding associations between age, civil status, sex
and CHW performance, probably because of the specificity of the task or the social context.
Finally, this study helps to understand better which are the socio-demographic features that explain
performance in Guinea-Bissau CHW program, also testing for the effect of sociocultural features like
ethnicity. In addition, the paper shows how workers’ extrinsic motivation correspond to improved
performance whether negative social impact perception2 negatively correlate with performance.
2For a detailed explanation of this variable see section 4.1.2
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3. DESCRIPTION
3.1. DATA
The data we use for our study was collected by 24 NOVAFRICA enumerators and 4 supervisors in
2017 during the baseline survey of the project “Impact Evaluation of Different Incentive Systems
for Community Health Agents in Guinea-Bissau”, implemented by NOVAFRICA Knowledge Centre in
partnership with ONG VIDA. The survey was designed for an impact evaluation of CHWs, gathering
data at the household and individual level (Socio-demographic characteristics, consumption, transfers,
occupation, health, social relations, intrinsic motivation, volunteering experience). Besides that, we have
included administrative data collected by VIDA to measure agents’ performance. Data has been cleaned
in Stata 15 version.
3.2. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
In the next subsection we analyze CHWs’ descriptive statistics in terms of job status, education,
socio-demographics and community participation. In the other subsection, we will provide some
background information on ethnic groups. As said before, we expand on 6 ethnicities only (Balanta,
Papéis, Majancos, Mandinga, Fula, Mancanha), which are the most represented in our sample, aggregating
all the remaining ones into one category ("Others") and taking "Balanta" ethnicity as reference group
(see tables A.2 A.3). In the "Others" group, we include an aggregated sample of 168 agents, identified by
ethnicities which count less than 30 agent each, for a total of 18 ethnicities.
3.2.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In our sample, the average CHW has 26 years (see Table 3.1), while the average household is composed
of 10 members. If we discuss about reported income and expenditures, workers earn on average 96,000
FCFA, whereas they report to spend on average 21,451 FCFA (32 Euro) per capita on a monthly basis. In
total, 75 percent of the CHWs have completed secondary education and the average education attainment
is the 12th grade, the last year of Secondary School. For what concerns Tertiary education, only 8 percent
of the sample has completed more advanced studies. Currently, half of the sample is still enrolled in
education programs. In total, workers’ mothers have average inferior levels of education (4 and a half
years) compared to their sons, similarly to agents’ fathers (8 years). During their life, agents have, on
average, covered one job position, with only 5 percent of them having worked abroad. Agents on average
start working at 21 years and a half, while they finish their studies after their 23rd birthday. One of the
most important figures for our analysis is the 43 percent unemployment rate, which refers to the last
12 months before starting the CHWs program. When we look at the distribution of workers per sector,
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we see 32 percent of the sample is employed in the small retailing sector, 17 percent owns a shop and
15 percent is in the agricultural sector. Additionally, in the last year before the CHWs program, people
participated to two and a half social events within the community and on average covered 1.8 leadership
roles. Overall, 86% of the agents participated to some kind of community activity, 80% have participated
in volunteering activities different from the CHW program and 32% covered some leadership roles . Some
of those positions includes: elected leader (22%), non-elected leader (8%) or religious leader(10.5%).
Other position with social status include being a professor (14%) or other positions (4.5%), which stands
for participation in religious or sport organizations.
3.2.1.1. GENDER Having a look at table A.1, it is immediate to infer gender differences. On the one hand,
there is no particular gender difference in terms of consumption or income. For what matters education,
women predict 9% increase in current enrolment in education programs. On the other hand, there are
strong differences in terms of employment and household duties, with women generally appointed to
inside and outside house chores (18% and 24% more) or carrying on a small retailing business (23%
more), besides decreased women participation in the agricultural sector or skilled professions. Also, we
notice strong differences in community participation and social relations, with women being less likely
to be appointed for leadership positions, to participate in social events and also to trust the community.
Those results are confirmed by a t-test on the mean.
3.2.1.2. WEALTH INDEX To account for differences in Wealth, we construct a wealth index following
the dummy variable approach by Filmer and Pritchett [15]. To run the factor analysis, we include
variables for household objects, rooms, water access, cooking combustible, restroom facility, livestock
and land possessions [46]. Following the categorization by INE (The National Institute of Statistics of
Guinea-Bissau), we divide between improved or rudimentary assets or facilities [35]. Subsequently,
we run a factor analysis which loads 15 factors with eigenvalue grater than 1. We retain the first two
components, as shown by Filmer and Pritchett [15]. Therefore, we divide the obtained result into quartiles,
in order to discriminate four wealth levels. As a next step, we create dummy variable for each quartile, to
be included in our regressions as controls.
3.2.2. ETHNICITIES’ ORIGINS
A relevant first picture is given by differences in religion: in our sample, Mandinga and Fula are mostly
Muslim (95% and 94%), with the aggregated group reaching 47%. The remaining four are mostly Catholic,
with a relevant fraction of Balanta and Papéis declaring being Evangelic (27% and 17%). A survey by
INE [10] concludes the country is overall mostly represented by the ethnicity Fula (28.5%) and Balanta
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(22.5%). The former is also the group which uses the most (87%) its own dialect (Fula) on a daily basis.
If in the capital different ethnicities live together and maintain constant interaction, they have in most
of the cases very different geographic origin. Fula has its origins in the north and East of the country,
in proximity with the border with Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, which made this ethnicity specialize
in trade and small retailing activities [23]. At the beginning of the XIX century, they converted to Islam
and started a Jihad. A similar origin is attributed to Mandinga, with some of them remembered to be
horse-riders, active in the slave traffic. The ethnicity Papél showed animist traditions, sharing a strong
connection with nature, which made them create religious sanctuaries. Most of them were living in the
regions of Bissau and Biombo, also known as "Tchon de Pépel" for their predominance [23]. If they were
originally specialized in arts and handicraft, nowadays they are well-known producers of cashew. Finally,
Balanta, Manjacos, and Mancanhas were mostly farmers, living on the cost of the region, where they
cultivated rice [23].
Table 3.1 – CHW Descriptive statistics
Variable N = 1014 Percent
Age
< 25 years 484 0.48
25 - 30 years 357 0.35
> 30 years 172 0.17
Sex
Women 460 0.45
Man 554 0.55
Marital Status
Single 928 0.92
Other 86 0.08
Language
Crioulo First language 931 0.92
Other Language 83 0.08
Religion
Muslim 325 0.32
Catholic 558 0.55
Other 131 0.13
Any Leadership Position 329 0.32
Education
< 12 grade 218 0.21
Completed 12 grade only 432 0.43
Enrolled in Tertiary Education 173 0.17
Completed Tertiary Education 191 0.19
Parents’ Education
Mother no education 374 0.37
Mother >= 1 grade 639 0.63
Father no education 158 0.16
Father >= 1 grade 855 0.84
Job
Shop owner 179 0.18
Shop employee 142 0.14
Employed in agricultural sector 155 0.15
Unemployed 433 0.43
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4. METHODOLOGY
4.1. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION METHOD
In the first part, we investigate whether motivation, social relations and characteristics of CHWs have an
effect on performance. As a second step, we investigate the effects of those variables on motivation, to
test if the direction of the effect goes from the covariates to motivation, which in turns may influence
performance. We can design the empirical approach as simple OLS regression and Probit models, in
which the independent variable y represents performance, following:
yi =α0+α1Xi +γ2Zi +²i (4.1)
In our case, for the OLS model the dependent variable is a continuous outcome-performance variable
for the agent i , measured with the administrative data by VIDA. The vector X includes variables specific
to each category (socio-demographic, social relations, motivation, ethnicity), meanwhile the vector Z
includes the control variables that are constant in each model we design (job outcomes, employment
status, education, parents’ education, language, household size, age, maritial status sex, religion). The
regression measures the variation in outcomes which can be explained by independent variables included
in our multiple regression model, using robust standard errors. In the case of the Probit model, the y is a
binary variable that takes value 1 if the agent has been inactive or dropped-out of the program. Therefore,
the given model predicts the probability of being inactive or dropping-out, conditional on the covariates.
Finally, following Feldhaus [14], we adopt an ordered multinomial logit model to measure the gender
and employment odd-ratios on different outcome variables. Taking from cumulative probability
definition, if i stands for the i th agent who show a performance corresponding to the j th points range,
Ci , j is the cumulative probability that the i th CHW scores at the same or superior levels:
Ci , j =
j∑
i=1
Pr(yi = k)
4.1.1. OUTCOMES VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
Community health care workers in Bissau context have been assigned the task to visit at least once per
month all the assigned families, in order to obtain the full monetary incentive. However, the incentive
depends on the agents’ reports of visited families number. Firstly, based on the information been provided
by VIDA supervisors we construct variables to account for the total gross days of activity of an agent
(see table 4.1). On average, an agent has worked 330 days, about 10 months. To better interpret this
information, we define a score variable which gives one point for each month a CHW is active and
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penalizes by one point for each month the worker is not active or drops-out of the program. Given the fact
we have collected monthly data from September 2017 to October 2018, with the exception of March 2018,
this variable could range from -10, to 12. Descriptive data tell us the mean score is 10 points. Additionally,
with further administrative data we construct two independent variables: we first account for the mean
value of the supervisor marks in the monthly performance evaluations, which can range from 0 to 5,
as upper value. Given to heterogeneity of supervisors in marking style, we design a fixed effects model
to account for differences in performance explained by this heterogeneity. We also include a dummy
variable to account for supervisor’ sex, to check if gender differences affect marks. Additionally, we use a
variable which describes the average of the pre and post-test the supervisors administer on CHWs during
monthly reunions, to test the assimilation of practices, concepts and basic health notions explained
during the meetings. This evaluation can range from 0 to 20, if obtaining the best result. We also look at
report rate, a variable that accounts for the percentage of delivered reports during the months the agent
was marked as active, allowing us to infer actual performance during days of activity. Based on similar
information, we count the total amount of reports they have delivered. This outcome, differs from the
fact it is not adjusted for the real months of activity a but is a gross measure of the reports delivered.
Lastly, we construct three binary outcomes for the probit model, with dummy variables to check if after
one year of Community Health agents program implementation, respectively: the i th worker has ever
been marked inactive or not, he ever dropped out of the program or not, he was active in the last month.
We also look at other data that account for outcomes reported by agents. Indeed, we know the inferior
quality of this data because of the asymmetric information agents possess and then report on their task
completion. This is also due to the fact the only implemented monitoring system is the presence of
supervisors in the field. Additionally, we analyze a visit rate, to account for the average rate of visited
families over the total number of assigned families, the average total number of monthly visits and the
average reported days of absence.
Finally, to obtain a global performance measure, we run a principle component analysis on independent
outcomes (report rate, average visits, supervisor reports, pre and post-test result, score), which loads two
components with eigenvalue superior than 1 and we retain the first principal component, which explain
larger variation of the chosen variables.
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Table 4.1 – Outcome Variables Synthesis
Variable Description Range Mean/σ N
Report Rate Percentage of delivered reports in the months the agent was marked as active "0%-100%" 0.66 1012
(0.31)
Average absence per month Average reported days of absence "0-30" 0.68 859
(1.97)
Monthly visit rate Average rate of visited families over the total number of assigned families "0%-100%" 0.84 938
(0.17)
Average total visits number Average total number of monthly visits "1/68" 44.16 938
10
Total Reports Total amount of reports delivered "0/12" 7.6 1012
(3.9)
Score variable Variable that adds one point for each month a CHW is active and detracts one point for each month of inactivity "-10/12" 10.1 1012
(4.53)
Total days of activity Total gross days of activity "30/360" 330.68 1012
(68.34)
Mark in pre and post test* Average of the pre and post-test administered by Supervisors during monthly reunions "0/10" 12.07 1012
(5.17)
Supervisor Report Average value of Supervisor marks in the monthly performance evaluations "0/5" 3.95 934
(0.78)
Dummy Inactivity Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CHW has ever missed one month of activity 0.2 1012
(0.4)
Dummy Drop-out Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CHW has ever dropped-out of the program 0.16 1012
(0.37)
Dummy Active Now Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CHW has been active in the last month (October 2018) 0.81 1012
(0.39)
4.1.2. MOTIVATION VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
In our survey, we have decided to infer agents’ motives selecting 9 different motivation variables: here we
explain what the other variables mean and refer to their literature.
According to the standard economic theory, a rational, selfish, and extrinsically motivated "homo
oeconomicus" [13]; [5], should respond to external incentives, in turns affecting performance. If this
neoclassical theory is a fundamental of economic theory, empirical confirmations of the theory are not
so easy to find in the literature. How Kuvaas [31] points-out, empirical research on the linkage between
extrinsic motivation and performance has been marginal and the few existing studies show ambiguous
effects on workers’ performance. Another motivation source is task significance, defined as an objective
structural design of the job which aims at increasing performance by enhancing employees’ perception
of the task effectiveness [43]. A step above is the social impact of a job, defined as the magnitude of the
impact employees perceive their job actually has on other people [19]. Another mechanism is instead
social worth, defined as the degree to which workers believe their actions are appreciated by recipients
of the program [19]. However, people appraise their experiences through the "lens of perception"
[41]: Grant and Cambell [20] distinguish between perceived pro-social impact, meaning the subjective
job experience of doing good to other people, rather than perceived antisocial impact, defined as the
subjective experience of harming others. The authors [20] show increased perception of negative social
impact lead to decreased job satisfaction and burnout, instead Carador [8] concludes perceived antisocial
impact produces a negative effect on job performance, in an empirical experiment on a pool of US Alumni.
We take the last two motivation variables from Ashraf and Lee [2]: desire for positive pro-social impact, in
other words how much an individual desires and shows psychological benefits from the positive impact of
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his work and finally affective commitment to beneficiaries, defined as the moral connection with recipients
of the program.
5. RESULTS
In this section we summarize main results, firstly developing a discussion on performance, than referring
on Heterogeneous effects and finally differences in motivation.
5.1. WHAT DRIVES PERFORMANCE?
5.1.1. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
We start our analysis examining the results of the basic model (see Table A.4 for OLS Model and A.8 for
Probit model). We notice those agents who held any leadership position perform on average 2 more visits
on a monthly basis, significant at the 5 percent.
Moreover, as Kambarami’s [26] points-out, job status and outcomes can influence performance. In our
context the first and very evident outcome is the effect of unemployment on performance. This category
predicts on average 1.25 points less in the score (19 days less of activity), significant at the 1 percent level.
Those people also perform 0.03 points less in terms of monthly visit rate, significant at the 5 percent. Also
the probit models confirms those workers are 45 percent more likely to be marked as inactive, 49 percent
more likely to drop-out and 39 percent to be inactive in the present, in open contrast with findings by
Olang’o [38], which found having a job was a predictor for increased drop-out rates, because of reduced
free time.
Looking instead at the employed part of the sample, statistical evidence confirms that only business
owners show a negative effect on performance, having normally worked 13 days less. As well, they report
to be 0.67 days more absent per month, significant at the 10 percent, and are found more likely to be
inactive in the past, present or drop-out.
Secondly, another interesting outcome is related to gender. In fact, we observe women obtaining an
inferior mark in the pre and post tests, quantified by a significant average of 0.94 less in terms of mark. If
on the one hand female CHWs report to be 0.39 days less absent per-month, they also deliver on average
about 8 percent reports less, significant at the 1 percent, and a total of 0.8 reports less (significant 10%).
On top of that, we find each additional year of education to increase the likelihood of being inactive
(8.6%), drop-out (8.8%) and finally not being active now (7.5%). In this case, results are aligned with
previous studies [27]: also in Bangladesh setting [1], more educated agents are found more likely to
drop-out.
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The last variable we observe showing significant effects on performance is wealth. In fact, CHWs
included in the two superior quartiles, perform significantly worse in comparison to the baseline category
with lowest wealth, in terms of activity, tests’ marks, report rate (10% significance) and finally monthly
visit rate (1% level). The result is confirmed by the probit model, which confirms the upper quartiles are
significantly more likely to drop-out or be inactive, pretty much in line with CHWs’ study in Bangladesh
context [1]. Interpreting one coefficient, the wealth index suggest agents in the top quartile generally
perform inferior monthly visit rate (significant at 1%) by a figure of about 5 percentage points, compared
to the baseline category (lowest quartile).
Similar results are drawn in almost every alternative model we construct. Otherwise, no significant
outcome is found to correlate with money transfers, consumption and a different specification of
education models, differentiating for those agents who have completed secondary or tertiary education.
5.1.1.1. GENDER AND UNEMPLOYMENT: ODD-RATIOS FOR PERFORMANCE Given the fact we found
significant performance differentials for gender and unemployment, we decide to narrow in the
mechanism and take a comprehensive picture, with the aid of ordered multinomial logit or simple
logit models, calculating in each case odds-ratios. The odds ratio for gender is the odds that a female
agent has a higher score, compared to male colleagues, keeping all the other factors equal. The same
holds for an unemployed agent over employed. In this case, the p-value correspond to a test on the odds
ratio, in which under the null the odds ratio is equal to 1, implying no significant association between
two outcomes, instead the alternative hypothesis states the odds-ratio is different than one, implying
differences in relative probability.
For female, we confirm significant results in terms of report rate, average total visits, pre and post-test
result, supervisor report and activity. We run the model on supervisor evaluation with fixed effects and
dummies to account for the gender of the supervisor. For unemployed, the odds-ratio on monthly visit
rate, activity, probability of drop-out, being inactive in the present or past, are significant.
Interpreting the odds-ratio on supervisor reports, we can say for female CHWs, ceteris paribus, the
odds of being marked highly than man in supervisor reports, in other words being in a higher category of
performance, decreases by 31 percent, significant at the 1%. In a similar way, the odds of women showing
a superior report rate than man decreases by 35 percent. For unemployed, compared to employed, the
relative probability of dropping-out increases by 135 percent, ceteris paribus, significant at the 1%, while
the relative probability to be inactive increases by 95 percent, also significant at the 1% (see Table 5.1). To
confirm this intuition, the relative probability of being active in the present decreases by 51 percent for
unemployed.
This analysis helps us conclude our results differ previous literature [26] [9] that found women
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performing better in a CHW program: in our case, women are less likely to deliver a superior amount of
assigned monthly reports, to receive a superior mark in superior reports or in the written tests. On the
other hand, also unemployed CHWs are found to perform worse: they are about twice as like to drop-out
or be inactive (present or past) and show a decrease in the relative probability of delivering monthly
reports by 23%.
Table 5.1 – Female and Unemployed Community Health Workers Odd-Ratios
Variable OR (Female) OR (Unemployed) N
Report Rate 0.65*** 0.78* 1010
(0.08) (0.10)
Average absence per month 0.86 0.77 857
(0.16) (0.15)
Monthly visit rate 1.01 0.77* 936
(0.13) (0.10)
Average total visits number 0.76** 0.72** 936
(0.09) (0.10)
Total Reports 0.69*** 0.75** 1,010
(0.08) (0.10)
Score variable that gives 1 point for one month of activity and penalizes 0.78 0.51*** 1,010
(0.13) (0.10)
Total days of activity of a CHW 0.78 0.51*** 1,010
(0.13) (0.10)
Mark in pre and post test 0.78** 0.83 930
(0.10) (0.11)
Supervisor Report 0.69*** 0.79* 932
(0.09) (0.11)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CHW has ever missed one month of activity 1.31 2.15*** 1,010
(0.23) (0.39)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CHW has ever dropped out of the program 1.04 2.35*** 1,010
(0.19) (0.48)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CHW has been active in the last month 0.87 0.51*** 1,010
(0.15) (0.10)
Control variables included: job outcomes, employment status, education, parents’ education, language, household size, age, maritial status sex, religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Fixed effect and Supervisor Sex dummies included in the Supervisor Report estimation
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.1.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
As previous authors remarked, "community embeddedness" [7], meaning social interactions, relations
and participation, are shown to be important determinants for community health care workers’
performance. In the next part of the analysis, we focus on the correlation between social relations
and performance variables (see Tables A.5, A.8).
In our case, the only significant result is the correlation between those who have participated in the last
12 month to any kind of social meeting or activity (associations, meetings, seminars) and performance.
Those people are on average 18 days more active than their colleagues, less likely to be inactive in the
past (48%) and the present (47%), or to drop-out(44%). As well, they normally deliver 8 percent more
reports, a gross total of 1.2 more reports and 19 days more of activity, on average.
5.1.3. MOTIVATION
As a next step, we ask which are the motivation variables that correlate with performance in the aggregate,
to infer which is the main source of motivation and how this relates with performance for the entire
sample. After having this done, we immediately notice the effect of those who are extrinsically motivated
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(see Table A.6 for OLS model and A.9 for Probit model). In fact, one more point in extrinsic motivation
corresponds to about 1.3 days more of activity (0.09 more points in the performance score, ceteris paribus,
significant at the 5%). In addition, the same variable is found to correlate with other performance
variables: one point more in extrinsic motivation corresponds to 2 percent decrease in likelihood of being
active now and in the past, and not to surrender, significant at the 10 percent. It also corresponds to
more 0.06 percentage points in the monthly report rate and a gross handing-in of 0.09 more reports,
significant at the 1%. This results openly contrast with recent findings by Kuvaas [31], which argues
extrinsic motivation either has no effect or affects negatively performance in the context of gas station
employees in Norway. However, our context appears to be at the odds with Norway and we found no
other papers that directly investigate extrinsic motivation and performance, especially in developing
countries.
Another significant result on performance is given by perceived negative social impact: Grant and
Cambell [20] show the linkage between negative social impact and decreased job satisfaction. If this
creates in satisfaction, the perceived antisocial impact on performance linkage is not addressed in the
literature. An exception is a study by Carador [8] in a developed country. In our Community Health
Agents setting in Guinea-Bissau, we reach a similar conclusion: we find workers with higher perception
of negative social impact are inferiorly marked by Supervisors. Ceteris paribus, each additional point
in this motivation variable corresponds to a decrease in supervisor evaluations by 4 percentage points,
significant at the 1 percent level with the fixed effects model.
5.1.4. ETHNICITY
A paper by Murayama [36] is one of the first to investigate on the relation between ethnicity and
performance. If in their case the mechanism was a facilitated interaction and connection between
recipient and deliverer of the program if belonging to the same ethnic group, in our study we aim at
investigating the direct relationship between ethnicity and performance (see tables A.7, A.9).
When we run the models, we notice agents from the ethnicity Papel are 34 percent more likely not being
active in the present, significant at the 10 percent and confirmed by the t-test (p-value=0.09). This is,
however, the only significant result we find, thus concluding ethnicities alone do not explain significant
performance differentials.
5.1.5. HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS
If in the previous sections we have showed how some socio-economic, motivation and social community
variables have significant effect on performance, we suspect for the existence of heterogeneous effects
on performance, due to the existence of sub-populations defined by different interactions with the
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community.
We run a model to check for socio-demographic interactions with social roles variables (see Tables
5.2). When we look at interactions between unemployed and social relations we see interesting results.
The interaction with community leadership position is in fact significant at the 5% level (Wald test
p=0.00) and predicts about 0.6 points increase in the overall performance. The same result we get when
we disaggregate the type of leadership positions, with elected and non-elected leadership positions
significantly interacting with unemployed in terms of performance.
When repeating the same exercise for women, we find female CHWs who also have inside-household
duties perform about 0.88 points less (1%), also confirmed by a Wald test (p-value=0.00). Otherwise, we
do not find evidence for differences in community interaction for ethnicities.
Table 5.2 – Interaction Model table
(1) (2)
Overall Performance
Controls X X
Employment Status: Unemployed=1 -0.556∗∗∗
(0.121)
Employment Status: Unemployed -0.356∗∗∗
(0.103)
Dummy for any leadership position=1 -0.306∗
(0.123)
Employment Status: Unemployed=1 ×Dummy for any leadership position=1 0.623∗∗
(0.202)
Sex (Female) -0.282∗∗ 0.541∗
(0.0966) (0.230)
Household Duties=1 0.0492
(0.131)
Sex (Female)=1 ×Household Duties=1 -0.877∗∗∗
(0.247)
Observations 1012 1008
R2 0.062 0.061
F 3.152 3.323
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.2. WHAT DRIVES MOTIVATION?
Given the fact that motivation is found to influence performance, even if only for two indicators
over nine, it seems equally important to investigate the relationship between motivation and
different socio-economic, demographic, cultural and community variables that could explain different
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motivation orientations, to better understand whether the relationship goes from socio-demographics to
performance directly or they affect performance through motivation.
As a consequence, we estimate two models, the first one including socio-demographics and ethnicities,
and the second, expanding with community involvement variables (see Tables 5.3, 5.4). Having a first
look at ethnicities and motivation, our analysis does not found evidence of differences in motivation
across ethnicities.
When looking at the results on socio-demographic characteristics, the picture changes. Firstly,
motivation is different across age: an additional age corresponds to increase in perceived pro-social
impact, at a decreasing rate. A very interesting result is the negative effect that education implies on the
perception of the significance of the task; in fact, one additional year of education corresponds to 0.11
points less in this variable and 0.06 points less in perceived pro-social impact, but this effect goes away
once we add more controls. However, in both cases those who are currently enrolled in an education
program, give less significance on the task nature (0.47 points less, significant at the 1%). Education
level is also found to correlate with antisocial impact perception at the 10% level. Similarly, women show
superior negative social impact perception (0.29 points more, significant at the 10%) , which we found to
negatively correlate with Supervisor reports, and they also receive increased task-significance evaluation.
When expanding the model to look for the effect of community participation variables, we found
those who have covered leadership positions give more significance to the task (0.53 points, significant
at the 5 percent), perceive 0.3 points more social impact and 0.18 points more affective involved with
beneficiaries. However, we also find a negative correlation of the number of appointments within the
community and few motivation variables: willingness to have pro-social impact, perceived social impact
and value, extrinsic motivation and affective involvement with beneficiaries. We decide to investigate
in detail the mechanism behind, with the aid of t-tests. As a consequence, we find those results are
determined by some specific type of community positions. In fact, teachers (15% of the sample) recognize
inferior social value and social impact on the task, such as the category "other", which includes (p=0.09)
very heterogeneous positions like appointments for the neighbourhood organizations, football teams and
religious volunteering organizations. However, those workers are more willing to have a pro-social impact,
more pro-socially motivated (p=0.04), inferiorly extrinsic motivated (p=0.4 and p=0.6) but inferiorly
involved with beneficiaries (p=0.06) of the program. The opposite is true, instead, for community leaders,
who score a significant positive difference in terms of perceived social-impact.
Lastly, this model predicts the biggest negative determinant of motivation variables is the first language
spoken. In fact, those who speak creole as a first language perform significantly less in every variable,
predicting 0.52 more points in perceived negative social impact. The result is statistically confirmed by a
t-test, which makes us reject the null in every case except one (Involvement with beneficiaries).
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Table 5.3 – Motivation Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Positive pro-social impact desire Affective involvement beneficiaries Extrinsic Motivation Perceived antisocial impact Perceived pro-social impact
Age 0.212 0.157 0.0736∗ 0.0536 -0.0548 -0.108 -0.110 -0.0915 0.118∗ 0.105∗
(0.164) (0.153) (0.0351) (0.0333) (0.210) (0.206) (0.0799) (0.0795) (0.0546) (0.0531)
Age Squared -0.00358 -0.00277 -0.00116 -0.000836 0.000511 0.00129 0.00189 0.00162 -0.00187∗ -0.00167
(0.00281) (0.00263) (0.000599) (0.000566) (0.00342) (0.00340) (0.00138) (0.00137) (0.000921) (0.000900)
Marital Status (Single) -0.0128 -0.0603 -0.0117 -0.0213 -0.453 -0.566 0.164 0.216 0.0662 0.0555
(0.410) (0.409) (0.0828) (0.0837) (0.725) (0.715) (0.190) (0.195) (0.141) (0.145)
Sex (Female) -0.231 -0.368 0.0878 0.0626 0.658 0.391 0.287∗ 0.270∗ -0.0510 -0.103
(0.240) (0.230) (0.0522) (0.0515) (0.365) (0.371) (0.126) (0.131) (0.0869) (0.0840)
Education Level -0.0312 0.0267 -0.00464 0.0140 0.0286 0.0557 0.0927∗ 0.0898 -0.0645∗ -0.0476
(0.0894) (0.0786) (0.0186) (0.0169) (0.134) (0.128) (0.0462) (0.0467) (0.0294) (0.0273)
Being a student during the academic year 2016/2017 -0.457 -0.315 -0.0724 -0.0712 -0.670 -0.462 0.148 0.153 -0.0618 -0.0335
(0.244) (0.220) (0.0517) (0.0491) (0.371) (0.345) (0.122) (0.119) (0.0853) (0.0787)
Dummy for any leadership position 0.127 0.474 0.0700 0.182∗ 0.354 0.777 -0.0963 -0.0893 0.0497 0.115
(0.260) (0.318) (0.0548) (0.0735) (0.405) (0.498) (0.133) (0.173) (0.0920) (0.120)
Creole as first language -0.893∗∗ -0.875∗ -0.101 -0.128 -1.311∗ -1.140 0.524∗∗ 0.512∗∗ -0.286∗ -0.308∗
(0.338) (0.343) (0.0798) (0.0804) (0.653) (0.641) (0.185) (0.183) (0.122) (0.124)
Employment Status: Unemployed -0.183 -0.0356 0.0144 0.0187 -0.637 -0.683 -0.207 -0.318 0.0168 0.0336
(0.276) (0.315) (0.0565) (0.0665) (0.419) (0.501) (0.128) (0.189) (0.0968) (0.116)
Fula 0.0747 0.0421 -0.249 -0.177 0.0794
(0.532) (0.114) (0.877) (0.289) (0.195)
Mancanha 0.413 0.103 0.884 0.114 0.0845
(0.399) (0.0895) (0.638) (0.212) (0.146)
Mandinga 0.401 0.0935 1.465 -0.128 0.0562
(0.530) (0.116) (0.832) (0.287) (0.202)
Papéis -0.433 -0.0463 -0.595 0.0174 -0.145
(0.467) (0.103) (0.677) (0.194) (0.162)
Manjacos 0.0397 0.139 -0.0660 0.352 0.0251
(0.375) (0.0778) (0.567) (0.208) (0.136)
Other -0.307 0.0392 0.460 0.0563 -0.0205
(0.435) (0.0910) (0.656) (0.204) (0.159)
Social participation Dummy 0.573 0.0334 0.963 0.301 0.108
(0.386) (0.0829) (0.601) (0.202) (0.135)
Volunteer in the family -0.164 -0.0458 0.707 -0.240 0.112
(0.265) (0.0590) (0.414) (0.131) (0.0904)
Number of activities 0.0341 0.00107 0.206 -0.0244 -0.0143
(0.0823) (0.0182) (0.134) (0.0478) (0.0307)
Number of appointments -0.292∗ -0.0660∗ -0.618∗∗ 0.0245 -0.0695
(0.137) (0.0313) (0.201) (0.0742) (0.0487)
Appointment Dummy -0.303 -0.0982 1.250 -0.313 0.213
(0.556) (0.110) (0.837) (0.361) (0.193)
Volunteer 0.568 0.119 -0.00649 -0.136 -0.104
(0.518) (0.107) (0.747) (0.337) (0.177)
Observations 1011 1001 1011 1001 1011 1001 1011 1001 1011 1001
R2 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.033 0.041 0.046 0.045 0.029 0.028
F 1.317 1.487 1.305 1.259 1.428 1.927 1.929 1.957 1.199 1.352
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.4 – Motivation Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Perceived Social Impact Pro-social Motivation Task Significance Perceived Social Value
Age 0.0999 0.0808 -0.0144 -0.0128 0.140 0.107 0.0797 0.0694
(0.0541) (0.0499) (0.0819) (0.0819) (0.0848) (0.0805) (0.0427) (0.0395)
Age Squared -0.00155 -0.00123 0.000304 0.000201 -0.00229 -0.00178 -0.00117 -0.00100
(0.000934) (0.000861) (0.00135) (0.00136) (0.00144) (0.00137) (0.000720) (0.000659)
Marital Status (Single) -0.0775 -0.101 0.178 0.190 0.0292 0.0231 -0.0694 -0.0811
(0.129) (0.127) (0.253) (0.256) (0.216) (0.211) (0.106) (0.106)
Sex (Female) -0.000193 -0.0569 -0.265 -0.221 0.258∗ 0.222 -0.0417 -0.0726
(0.0833) (0.0784) (0.141) (0.145) (0.126) (0.126) (0.0672) (0.0663)
Education Level -0.0124 0.00531 0.0440 0.0303 -0.116∗∗ -0.0867∗ -0.0218 -0.0108
(0.0300) (0.0268) (0.0523) (0.0520) (0.0447) (0.0418) (0.0252) (0.0229)
Being a student during the academic year 2016/2017 -0.115 -0.0659 -0.103 -0.0566 -0.469∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.0570 -0.0305
(0.0836) (0.0780) (0.140) (0.135) (0.127) (0.123) (0.0687) (0.0655)
Dummy for any leadership position 0.134 0.317∗∗ 0.248 0.0760 0.458∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗ -0.0469 0.0325
(0.0883) (0.117) (0.151) (0.196) (0.132) (0.169) (0.0705) (0.0944)
Creole as first language -0.437∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -1.043∗∗∗ -1.091∗∗∗ -0.420∗ -0.403∗ -0.246∗∗ -0.235∗∗
(0.100) (0.0966) (0.265) (0.266) (0.192) (0.189) (0.0923) (0.0895)
Employment Status: Unemployed -0.0280 0.0258 0.0493 -0.0356 0.0193 0.139 -0.0412 0.00284
(0.0915) (0.116) (0.158) (0.205) (0.139) (0.174) (0.0715) (0.0905)
Fula -0.0329 0.156 0.0596 0.00870
(0.180) (0.360) (0.284) (0.172)
Mancanha 0.0318 -0.184 0.0449 0.144
(0.134) (0.269) (0.232) (0.135)
Mandinga 0.0586 -0.127 0.154 0.161
(0.177) (0.326) (0.278) (0.159)
Papéis -0.201 -0.316 0.0187 0.145
(0.156) (0.239) (0.233) (0.125)
Manjacos -0.164 -0.175 0.298 0.240∗
(0.149) (0.238) (0.205) (0.114)
Other -0.0611 -0.226 0.146 0.0778
(0.143) (0.243) (0.219) (0.130)
Social participation Dummy 0.361∗ -0.276 0.159 0.224
(0.148) (0.235) (0.199) (0.121)
Volunteer in the family 0.0548 0.153 0.0919 0.0197
(0.0903) (0.166) (0.137) (0.0788)
Number of activities 0.00413 0.0499 0.0344 0.0278
(0.0285) (0.0519) (0.0465) (0.0240)
Number of appointments -0.149∗∗ 0.0647 -0.120 -0.101∗
(0.0479) (0.0830) (0.0777) (0.0419)
Appointment Dummy -0.106 0.154 0.0898 0.196
(0.203) (0.322) (0.266) (0.141)
Volunteer 0.217 -0.332 0.237 0.00163
(0.194) (0.300) (0.261) (0.121)
Observations 1011 1001 1011 1001 1011 1001 1011 1001
R2 0.035 0.043 0.043 0.036 0.050 0.047 0.027 0.040
F 1.645 2.358 1.786 1.549 1.930 2.380 1.389 2.026
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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6. DISCUSSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
We found evidence that social relations might in part explain performance: those who are active in the
community or have recently covered leadership positions, show a positive outcome. As other papers
suggested, the selection [22] process can be relevant to determine CHWs’ performance: it could be an
effective strategy superiorly appraising those individuals who have covered leadership positions or are
involved within the community. In terms of motivation, we have seen leaders are superiorly motivated
for the CHW program; however, some social positions, besides their increased desire to have a pro-social
impact and increased pro-social motivation, are inferiorly involved with beneficiaries of the program,
recognize inferior social value and social impact on the task. It might be relevant to research in depth
the reason why professors have such preferences, especially recalling how in various settings pro-social
agents show better public service delivery or increased retention rates ([44], [2], [11]).
In addition, we recall how in the previous analysis we found a significant correlation between
unemployment3 and overall inferior levels of performance (activity, report rate, monthly visit rate,
retention). Our only measure of knowledge (pre and post-test) does not suggest those people have inferior
sector-specific expertise. Community interaction seems to have a determinant role in unemployed agents’
performance: the heterogeneous group of unemployed agents, who are more involved in the community,
performs significantly better. Those who have recently held a leadership (either elected or not) position,
are performing much better than those unemployed that did not cover leadership positions. An additional
mechanism here may be the intensified perception the program lacks adequate financial incentives, a
serious issue for those who are unemployed and have financial troubles [29]. We lack however, adequate
data to confirm this hypothesis.
Furthermore, we can analyse the picture of the agents in terms of education and age. In our setting,
more educated agents show inferior retention rates. A similar conclusion is drawn in Peru context [6]
by Brown, who argues CHWs with higher educational qualifications may have better opportunities for
alternative employment, being more likely to change job position and drop-out. On the other hand, we do
not find evidence that additional education levels explain other outcomes such tests, reports delivery or
monthly visits. Additionally, we find more educated people or agents that have been enrolled in education
programs are less motivated in terms of significance of the task perception and perceived pro-social
impact. However, we do not find these motivation variables to correlate with performance. Consideration
are different for older community health care workers: those agents show, in fact, significant more
connection with beneficiaries of the program and increased perceived pro-social impact, even if those
variables do not explain different performance levels.
3This part of the sample includes people who are currently looking for a job and did not cover any position in the past 12 months.
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Referring about gender, we found female workers showing inferior outcomes in the written test,
supervisor evaluation and inferior delivered monthly and total reports. If tests are reliable predictors of
knowledge, this would imply women have inferior sector specific expertise, therefore raising potential
concerns in terms of public service efficient delivery. Suspects are confirmed when we notice inferior
outcomes in terms of reports and supervisor marks. However, in the descriptive analysis we have
shown women do not have inferior education, compared to man. When looking at motivation, women
show increased antisocial impact perception, which we found to negatively correlate with performance
(Supervisor reports). If our intuition is valid, considering the difference is not explained by education,
and we cannot test for differences in terms of ability, a cost-effective intervention could, for example,
tackle methods to foster knowledge retention during trainings.
Furthermore, as we have shown, pretty much in line with other developing countries settings [12],
job professions are differentiated for man and woman, with the latter facing the burden of increased
household duties. The analysis of heterogeneous effects for gender demonstrates how women who have
house duties to accomplish, show inferior overall performance, compared to those who do not have
such obligations. Nevertheless, looking at descriptive statistics for participation in community activities
and general social interaction, we notice inferior figures for women, who are also under represented in
leadership roles. When running heterogeneous effects models for differences in performance across
leadership roles or community participation for women, but we do not find evidence of different
performance of women in leadership positions in our program.
Overall, we have shown how people that are extrinsically motivated significantly perform better,
meanwhile those who show higher antisocial impact perceptions perform worse, in terms of Supervisor
reports. The effect of extrinsic motivated people on performance appears quite sharp (score, visits rate,
report rate) and it might be desirable to select those people that score particularly high in terms of
extrinsic motivation, maybe with the aid of screening tests during the selection process. However, such
motivation orientation remains very difficult to test in practice. On the contrary, the negative effect
of antisocial impact on performance does not have the same magnitude and we have seen that some
demographics (education and gender) can explain this motivation orientation. In this case, the result
highlights some issues, as those agents superiorly perceive they have caused some harm or, in general,
negative impact, as a consequence of their job duties. It might be relevant to narrow in and investigate
which are the factors that contribute generating this job’s effect negative perception, also because this
motivation correlates with negative performance.
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7. CONCLUSION
We found, in line with previous papers, that some socio-demographic characteristics like education,
gender, wealth, job status and community "embededdness" correlate with community health workers
performance. In the specific, we conclude higher education corresponds to increased drop-out rates,
while for female we find evidence of performance differentials in terms of written health-knowledge
tests, supervisors evaluations and report rates. We give evidence that this result could be driven by
the heterogeneous group of women with house duties to accomplish. We also develop an extensive
discussion on unemployed agents, which we report to perform inferiorly in our program. By contrast, we
notice that unemployed workers that have recent experience in covering leadership roles are performing
much better than their counterpart.
Moreover, we investigate the relation between motivation and performance in our Community Health
Care workers context. We find evidence that extrinsically motivated agents perform better, as opposed to
agents with stronger antisocial impact perceptions, who perform worse. Besides scholars have extensively
discussed the concept of extrinsic motivation and investigated the effect of extrinsic incentives, there is
still a lack of empirical studies that address the link between extrinsically motivated workers and their
job performance, with the exception of a research on Norwegian employees that founds opposite results.
For negative perceived social impact, instead, we confirm the intuition supported by psychological
motivation theories, which found small empirical evidence.
Few community relations variables are found to significantly correlate with performance: leadership
position and social participation correspond to improved performance levels. Also, community
participation can explain motivation differentials in our context. We conclude covering many social roles
can crowd-out motivation for the CHW program, but this appears to be driven by some social professions
or positions like professor or volunteer in other organizations.
Given the richness of our data, we explore if different ethnicity can explain performance or motivation
differentials. In both cases we find few significant results.
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A. APPENDIX
A.1. TABLES
Table A.1 – Gender Differences Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Difference pF
Marital Status (Single) 1014 0.92 -0.020 0.26
(0.018)
Income 1013 101463.9 -11592.7 0.51
(17502.2)
Monthly per-capita consumption 1004 21333.2 260.1 0.87
(1583.3)
Weekly alchool consumption 1013 7275.0 -1747.1 0.085*
(1012.3)
Education Level 1014 12.4 -0.012 0.90
(0.093)
Completed Secondary Education 1014 0.81 -0.044* 0.091*
(0.026)
Completed Tertiary Education 1014 0.067 0.033*** 0.059*
(0.018)
Being a student during the academic year 2016/2017 1014 0.46 0.093*** 0.00***
(0.031)
Mother Education 1013 4.43 0.60 0.06*
(0.32)
Father Education 1014 7.77 0.86 0.02**
(0.36)
Parents with low Education 1014 0.45 -0.085*** 0.01***
(0.031)
Employment Status: Unemployed 1014 0.44 -0.034 0.28
(0.031)
Working in the small retailing sector 1014 0.21 0.23*** 0.00***
(0.029)
Working as skilled non-professional 1005 0.15 -0.12*** 0.00***
(0.017)
Working in the agricultural sector 1014 0.21 -0.12*** 0.00***
(0.022)
Household Duties 1010 0.76 0.18*** 0.00***
(0.021)
Outside Household duties 1009 0.51 0.24*** 0.00***
(0.029)
Volunteer in the family 1009 0.25 -0.036** 0.17
(0.027)
Number of activities 1014 2.75 -0.68*** 0.00***
(0.10)
Number of appointments 1014 2.09 -0.55*** 0.00***
(0.086)
Social participation Dummy 1014 0.90 -0.089*** 0.00***
(0.022)
Appointment Dummy 1014 0.90 -0.087*** 0.00***
(0.023)
Talking with leader dummy 1014 0.86 -0.056** 0.02**
(0.024)
Do you trust your community? 1013 0.90 -0.094*** 0.00***
(0.022)
Dummy for any leadership position 1014 0.40 -0.16*** 0.00***
(0.029)
Volunteer 1014 0.84 -0.079*** 0.00***
(0.025)
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Table A.2 – Ethnicities Statistics
Variable N Mean (Balanta) Papéis Mandinga Manjacos Fula Mancanha Others pF
Age 1013 24.6 1.94*** 1.51** 1.55*** 0.30 1.69*** 1.37 0.00***
(0.56) (0.63) (0.59) (0.54) (0.57) (0.55)
Marital Status (Single) 1014 0.96 -0.052* -0.060** -0.0065 -0.077** -0.056* -0.087*** 0.01*
(0.026) (0.031) (0.023) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029)
Sex (Female) 1014 0.42 -0.014 -0.044 0.064 0.12** 0.11* 0.032 0.06*
(0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.053)
Education Level 1014 12.4 -0.0068 -0.24 0.20 0.011 0.16 -0.12 0.29
(0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Being a student during the academic year 2016/2017 1014 0.58 -0.15*** -0.014 -0.072 -0.022 -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.01***
(0.053) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.053)
Completed Tertiary Education 1014 0.82 -0.053 -0.098** 0.0087 -0.057 -0.0077 -0.046 0.33
(0.044) (0.050) (0.043) (0.048) (0.046) (0.043)
Cmpleted Secondary Education 1014 0.077 0.0013 0.0055 0.035 -0.0027 0.026 -0.017** 0.76
(0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027)
Mother Education 1013 4.13 0.066 0.048 0.42 0.66 3.09*** 0.39 0.00***
(0.53) (0.59) (0.56) (0.58) (0.62) (0.53)
Father Education 1014 7.85 -0.64 0.0082 0.65 0.23 1.98*** 0.45 0.01**
(0.63) (0.67) (0.64) (0.67) (0.66) (0.61)
Income 1013 96907.2 12164.5 -28493.5 -24836.8 1044.4 11640.1 14142.2 0.49
(27458.1) (27145.3) (25791.7) (41123.4) (28319.0) (33456.9)
Monthly per-capita consumption 1004 17802.2 3594.8 5748.3** 3909.3 7453.8** 4838.8* 2179.6 0.10
(2247.0) (2721.3) (2674.6) (3252.5) (2571.9) (2075.3)
Catholic 1014 0.68 0.077 -0.63*** 0.16*** -0.63*** 0.26*** -0.26*** 0.00***
(0.048) (0.040) (0.047) (0.040) (0.041) (0.052)
Muslim 1014 0.022 0.0021 0.92*** 0.0080 0.93*** -0.0048 0.45*** 0.00***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.040)
Creole as first language 1014 0.93 0.023 -0.027 -0.011 -0.13*** 0.028 0.012 0.01***
(0.025) (0.033) (0.030) (0.041) (0.027) (0.026)
Household People 1014 10.5 -0.89 1.43** -1.30** -1.11** -2.54*** -0.26 0.00***
(0.57) (0.69) (0.62) (0.54) (0.55) (0.57)
Employment Status: Unemployed 1014 0.49 -0.14*** -0.025 -0.059 -0.025 -0.15*** -0.057 0.04**
(0.052) (0.059) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.053)
Working in the small retailing sector 1014 0.28 0.045 0.074 0.050 0.0082 0.089 0.019 0.65
(0.049) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.049)
Working as skilled non-professional 1005 0.077 0.043 -0.012 0.020 0.022 0.0089 0.044** 0.59
(0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Working in the agricultural sector 1014 0.16 0.015 -0.060 -0.024 -0.093*** 0.12** 0.0022 0.00***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.035) (0.049) (0.039)
Dummy for any leadership position 1014 0.31 0.084 0.041 0.047 -0.049 -0.038 -0.0079 0.18
(0.051) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.049)
Volunteer in the family 1009 0.20 0.038 0.049 0.057 0.082 0.040 0.019 0.75
(0.044) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.043)
Number of activities 1014 2.20 0.11 0.52*** 0.057 0.16 0.32* 0.57*** 0.01**
(0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Number of appointments 1014 1.74 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.066 0.090 0.84
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Appointment Dummy 1014 0.85 0.045 0.038 -0.019 0.046 0.016 -0.049 0.17
(0.036) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.041)
Volunteer 1014 0.80 0.029 0.014 -0.037 0.038 0.040 -0.042 0.43
(0.042) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
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Table A.3 – Ethnicities Outcome Variables
Variable N Mean (Balanta) Papéis Mandinga Manjacos Fula Mancanha Others pF
Report Rate 1012 0.64 0.013 0.044 0.012 -0.026 0.0063 0.077** 0.11
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033)
Average absences 859 0.82 -0.19 -0.33 -0.11 0.12 -0.21 -0.25 0.71
(0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.36) (0.22) (0.21)
Monthly visit rate 938 0.83 0.031* 0.014 0.032 -0.020 0.044** 0.020 0.09*
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020)
Average visits 938 44.3 1.24 -1.23 0.041 -1.57 -0.83 0.60 0.24
(1.15) (1.26) (1.17) (1.32) (1.20) (1.16)
Total Reports 1012 7.32 0.17 0.59 0.23 -0.16 -0.03 0.96** 0.04**
(0.29) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.47) (0.41)
Score variable 1012 9.71 0.052 0.55 0.74 0.55 0.21 0.73 0.61
(0.54) (0.54) (0.52) (0.55) (0.62) (0.50)
Total Activity Days 1012 324.6 0.95 9.37 11.5 8.88 3.64 10.8 0.60
(8.07) (8.06) (7.82) (8.25) (9.37) (7.64)
Mark in pre and post-test 932 12.4 -0.90 -0.91 -0.090 -0.67 0.022 0.35 0.24
(0.61) (0.63) (0.60) (0.62) (0.64) (0.54)
Supervisor Reports 934 4.00 -0.078 -0.079 -0.032 -0.079 -0.14 0.010 0.66
(0.091) (0.11) (0.10) (0.088) (0.093) (0.091)
Inactivity Dummy 1012 0.18 0.052 0.056 0.022 0.015 0.0067 -0.0027 0.80
(0.044) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.041)
Drop-out Dummy 1012 0.18 0.028 -0.012 -0.040 -0.0037 -0.013 -0.057** 0.45
(0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038)
Active Now Dummy 1012 0.83 -0.063 -0.059 0.012 -0.018 -0.0092 0.016 0.45
(0.043) (0.047) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.040)
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Figure A.1 – Average Achieved Tertiary, Secondary Education by age; Average Unemployment and job positions by age
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A.3. REGRESSIONS
Table A.4 – Socio-demographics OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Score variable Total Activity Days Mark in pre and post-test Supervisor Reports Report Rate Average absences Monthly visit rate Average visits Total Reports
Age 0.355∗ 5.214∗ -0.190 0.0108 -0.00564 -0.0742 0.0126 0.173 -0.0632
(0.176) (2.646) (0.216) (0.0310) (0.0119) (0.0717) (0.00685) (0.400) (0.152)
Age Squared -0.00526 -0.0771 0.00333 0.0000707 0.000184 0.00100 -0.000124 0.00342 0.00220
(0.00283) (0.0425) (0.00354) (0.000487) (0.000193) (0.00118) (0.000108) (0.00651) (0.00248)
Marital Status (Single) 0.489 7.175 0.330 0.0364 -0.0157 0.181 0.0263 2.670∗ 0.00597
(0.559) (8.448) (0.650) (0.0666) (0.0353) (0.179) (0.0203) (1.260) (0.446)
Sex (Female) -0.0958 -1.671 -0.940∗ -0.0906 -0.0781∗∗∗ -0.388∗ -0.00387 -1.345∗ -0.831∗∗
(0.312) (4.708) (0.366) (0.0521) (0.0208) (0.151) (0.0114) (0.676) (0.259)
Education Level -0.172 -2.596 0.217 0.0230 0.00329 0.0301 -0.00117 -0.133 -0.0106
(0.105) (1.593) (0.126) (0.0158) (0.00692) (0.0343) (0.00367) (0.222) (0.0872)
Being a student during the academic year 2016/2017 0.0606 0.766 0.442 -0.0320 -0.00537 -0.135 0.0191 0.724 0.00282
(0.297) (4.483) (0.355) (0.0477) (0.0208) (0.127) (0.0118) (0.698) (0.259)
Mother Education -0.0416 -0.631 0.0194 -0.00301 0.000507 0.0117 0.000951 0.0577 -0.00585
(0.0362) (0.546) (0.0402) (0.00568) (0.00235) (0.0158) (0.00129) (0.0739) (0.0295)
Father Education 0.00882 0.118 -0.0335 0.00446 -0.00237 -0.0130 -0.000255 -0.00524 -0.0266
(0.0289) (0.436) (0.0346) (0.00472) (0.00195) (0.0145) (0.00108) (0.0640) (0.0245)
Dummy for any leadership position -0.309 -4.974 -0.242 0.0221 -0.0242 -0.185 0.0141 2.032∗∗ -0.370
(0.322) (4.858) (0.381) (0.0497) (0.0219) (0.151) (0.0114) (0.676) (0.274)
Employment Status: Unemployed -1.255∗∗∗ -18.98∗∗∗ -0.728 -0.0748 -0.0486∗ -0.212 -0.0331∗∗ -1.427 -0.684∗
(0.316) (4.771) (0.376) (0.0520) (0.0223) (0.126) (0.0126) (0.736) (0.278)
Owning a small retailing business -0.880∗ -13.38∗ -0.517 -0.00451 -0.0492 0.670∗ 0.00372 -0.444 -0.763∗
(0.395) (5.943) (0.470) (0.0542) (0.0264) (0.291) (0.0136) (0.887) (0.332)
Asset Index=2 -0.443 -6.669 -0.778 -0.108 -0.0144 -0.207 -0.0549∗∗∗ -0.933 -0.339
(0.367) (5.533) (0.456) (0.0625) (0.0264) (0.208) (0.0151) (0.895) (0.332)
Asset Index=3 -0.928∗ -13.88∗ -1.068∗ -0.143∗ -0.0624∗ -0.0810 -0.0537∗∗∗ -1.932∗ -0.842∗
(0.417) (6.277) (0.481) (0.0709) (0.0281) (0.226) (0.0150) (0.935) (0.352)
Asset Index=4 -0.772∗ -12.00∗ -1.450∗∗ -0.120 -0.0902∗∗ 0.0132 -0.0483∗∗∗ -1.493 -1.119∗∗
(0.392) (5.902) (0.466) (0.0642) (0.0289) (0.227) (0.0143) (0.908) (0.358)
Observations 1010 1010 930 932 1010 857 936 936 1010
R2 0.045 0.046 0.030 0.271 0.051 0.046 0.073 0.070 0.049
F 2.327 2.409 1.592 10.17 2.890 1.309 3.601 3.703 2.787
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.5 – Social Relations OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Score variable Total Activity Days Mark in pre and post-test Supervisor Reports Report Rate Average absences Monthly visit rate Average visits Total Reports
Volunteer in the family -0.749 -11.11 -0.910∗ -0.104∗ 0.00659 0.0122 -0.0141 -1.301 -0.0854
(0.386) (5.807) (0.463) (0.0494) (0.0256) (0.164) (0.0136) (0.836) (0.323)
Number of activities -0.154 -2.183 0.0271 -0.00245 -0.0122 0.0724 -0.00431 -0.182 -0.171
(0.118) (1.769) (0.140) (0.0178) (0.00816) (0.0709) (0.00442) (0.272) (0.103)
Number of appointments -0.0610 -1.111 -0.0602 0.0379 0.00393 -0.00552 -0.00549 0.319 -0.0272
(0.189) (2.854) (0.227) (0.0227) (0.0126) (0.0875) (0.00653) (0.398) (0.158)
Appointment Dummy 0.202 2.694 0.191 -0.119 -0.00508 0.506 -0.000484 0.990 0.0360
(0.839) (12.59) (0.812) (0.123) (0.0515) (0.306) (0.0281) (1.706) (0.647)
Social participation Dummy 1.245∗ 18.91∗ -0.191 0.0645 0.0891∗ -0.104 0.0374 1.396 1.256∗∗
(0.560) (8.470) (0.616) (0.0816) (0.0365) (0.197) (0.0225) (1.272) (0.452)
Age 0.361∗ 5.300∗ -0.176 0.0144 -0.00356 -0.0699 0.0132 0.248 -0.0390
(0.177) (2.655) (0.216) (0.0311) (0.0120) (0.0743) (0.00692) (0.397) (0.153)
Age Squared -0.00542 -0.0795 0.00298 -0.0000105 0.000144 0.000880 -0.000132 0.00202 0.00175
(0.00285) (0.0428) (0.00355) (0.000488) (0.000195) (0.00123) (0.000109) (0.00645) (0.00251)
Marital Status (Single) 0.401 5.869 0.344 0.0467 -0.0168 0.167 0.0223 2.492 -0.0373
(0.559) (8.463) (0.648) (0.0658) (0.0356) (0.182) (0.0205) (1.275) (0.448)
Sex (Female) -0.0494 -0.948 -0.891∗ -0.0702 -0.0749∗∗∗ -0.336∗ -0.00278 -1.099 -0.797∗∗
(0.322) (4.858) (0.377) (0.0533) (0.0211) (0.135) (0.0117) (0.695) (0.263)
Education Level -0.171 -2.579 0.207 0.0195 0.00142 0.0148 -0.000960 -0.195 -0.0297
(0.107) (1.622) (0.128) (0.0156) (0.00703) (0.0360) (0.00377) (0.223) (0.0884)
Dummy for any leadership position -0.365 -5.533 -0.246 -0.0481 -0.0401 -0.314 0.0193 1.078 -0.460
(0.434) (6.539) (0.529) (0.0632) (0.0304) (0.201) (0.0157) (0.957) (0.377)
Employment Status: Unemployed -1.273∗∗∗ -19.27∗∗∗ -0.732 -0.0639 -0.0477∗ -0.188 -0.0315∗ -1.220 -0.683∗
(0.315) (4.747) (0.381) (0.0525) (0.0224) (0.130) (0.0127) (0.744) (0.279)
Observations 1006 1006 927 929 1006 854 933 933 1006
R2 0.060 0.061 0.040 0.280 0.063 0.053 0.083 0.078 0.063
F 2.272 2.344 1.595 9.808 2.461 1.126 2.833 2.963 2.508
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.6 – Motivation OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Score variable Total Activity Days Mark in pre and post-test Supervisor Reports Report Rate Average absences Monthly visit rate Average visits Total Reports
Willingness to have a positive pro-social impact -0.0799 -1.168 0.00438 -0.00430 -0.00193 -0.0456 0.000461 -0.163 -0.0238
(0.0724) (1.088) (0.0807) (0.0122) (0.00454) (0.0359) (0.00248) (0.141) (0.0588)
Affective involvement with beneficiaries 0.128 1.706 -0.110 0.0335 -0.0107 -0.156 -0.00660 -0.560 -0.0721
(0.283) (4.238) (0.275) (0.0617) (0.0164) (0.136) (0.00894) (0.541) (0.216)
Extrinsic Motivation 0.0882∗∗ 1.365∗∗ -0.00834 0.00585 0.00657∗∗ -0.0326 0.00209∗ 0.153∗ 0.0927∗∗∗
(0.0329) (0.495) (0.0360) (0.00499) (0.00214) (0.0196) (0.00103) (0.0655) (0.0266)
Perceived negative social impact 0.0562 0.778 -0.0149 -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.000663 0.000572 -0.00104 -0.0195 0.00141
(0.0766) (1.152) (0.0902) (0.0120) (0.00576) (0.0314) (0.00301) (0.173) (0.0717)
Perceived pro-social impact 0.196 2.957 0.137 -0.0212 0.0138 0.165∗∗ -0.000801 0.0593 0.105
(0.174) (2.614) (0.211) (0.0276) (0.0122) (0.0548) (0.00631) (0.379) (0.150)
Perceived Social Impact -0.0818 -1.256 0.126 0.0269 -0.00270 0.117 0.00531 0.505 -0.0334
(0.163) (2.453) (0.202) (0.0264) (0.0111) (0.0702) (0.00677) (0.373) (0.139)
Pro-social Motivation(based on pleasure) 0.0332 0.484 -0.0121 -0.0189 -0.00129 0.0560 0.00102 0.0716 -0.00860
(0.0723) (1.087) (0.0881) (0.0130) (0.00492) (0.0295) (0.00279) (0.163) (0.0613)
Perception of the significance of the task 0.173 2.639 0.101 0.00317 0.00432 0.0295 0.000249 -0.0100 0.0904
(0.118) (1.780) (0.126) (0.0170) (0.00763) (0.0499) (0.00400) (0.243) (0.0951)
Perceived Social Value -0.0778 -1.221 -0.0533 0.00503 -0.0115 -0.0429 -0.00310 0.205 -0.150
(0.204) (3.117) (0.229) (0.0260) (0.0126) (0.0813) (0.00713) (0.425) (0.157)
Age 0.341 5.005 -0.222 0.00152 -0.00536 -0.0830 0.0127 0.179 -0.0589
(0.175) (2.639) (0.217) (0.0317) (0.0120) (0.0708) (0.00680) (0.402) (0.153)
Age Squared -0.00502 -0.0735 0.00386 0.000224 0.000183 0.00113 -0.000122 0.00333 0.00218
(0.00282) (0.0425) (0.00355) (0.000499) (0.000195) (0.00118) (0.000107) (0.00655) (0.00250)
Marital Status (Single) 0.489 7.192 0.331 0.0467 -0.0144 0.150 0.0275 2.768∗ 0.0279
(0.557) (8.405) (0.653) (0.0660) (0.0354) (0.179) (0.0201) (1.248) (0.446)
Sex (Female) -0.227 -3.631 -0.938∗ -0.0955 -0.0825∗∗∗ -0.357∗ -0.00381 -1.368∗ -0.913∗∗∗
(0.316) (4.762) (0.373) (0.0538) (0.0208) (0.152) (0.0115) (0.686) (0.260)
Education Level -0.152 -2.288 0.240 0.0255 0.00435 0.0415 -0.00132 -0.139 0.00117
(0.106) (1.609) (0.128) (0.0165) (0.00706) (0.0351) (0.00369) (0.225) (0.0886)
Dummy for any leadership position -0.423 -6.711 -0.294 0.0156 -0.0278 -0.212 0.0128 1.976∗∗ -0.437
(0.331) (4.984) (0.387) (0.0496) (0.0221) (0.157) (0.0114) (0.677) (0.276)
Employment Status: Unemployed -1.222∗∗∗ -18.47∗∗∗ -0.735 -0.0765 -0.0458∗ -0.254 -0.0314∗ -1.335 -0.642∗
(0.315) (4.750) (0.381) (0.0508) (0.0222) (0.130) (0.0126) (0.740) (0.276)
Observations 1010 1010 930 932 1010 857 936 936 1010
R2 0.066 0.068 0.034 0.285 0.066 0.065 0.080 0.081 0.068
F 2.302 2.383 1.298 9.388 2.643 1.126 2.901 3.150 2.720
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.7 – Ethnicity OLS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Score variable Total Activity Days Mark in pre and post-test Supervisor Reports Report Rate Average absences Monthly visit rate Total Reports
Age 0.356∗ 5.220∗ -0.195 0.00990 -0.00581 -0.0696 0.0117 -0.0622
(0.177) (2.655) (0.215) (0.0309) (0.0120) (0.0722) (0.00682) (0.153)
Age Squared -0.00528 -0.0772 0.00347 0.0000916 0.000184 0.000985 -0.000111 0.00216
(0.00284) (0.0427) (0.00353) (0.000486) (0.000195) (0.00118) (0.000108) (0.00249)
Marital Status (Single) 0.480 6.974 0.370 0.0407 -0.0136 0.195 0.0271 0.0244
(0.560) (8.476) (0.651) (0.0682) (0.0353) (0.184) (0.0201) (0.448)
Sex (Female) -0.120 -2.044 -0.970∗∗ -0.0934 -0.0753∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗ -0.00279 -0.802∗∗
(0.318) (4.793) (0.367) (0.0527) (0.0208) (0.163) (0.0114) (0.260)
Education Level -0.177 -2.667 0.209 0.0219 0.00416 0.0244 -0.000650 -0.00235
(0.106) (1.602) (0.127) (0.0159) (0.00691) (0.0355) (0.00368) (0.0874)
Dummy for any leadership position -0.309 -4.989 -0.165 0.0282 -0.0232 -0.182 0.0139 -0.362
(0.325) (4.900) (0.380) (0.0504) (0.0220) (0.151) (0.0115) (0.275)
Employment Status: Unemployed -1.275∗∗∗ -19.29∗∗∗ -0.752∗ -0.0744 -0.0485∗ -0.230 -0.0313∗ -0.688∗
(0.317) (4.770) (0.379) (0.0510) (0.0225) (0.125) (0.0127) (0.280)
Fula 0.513 8.623 -0.265 -0.00595 -0.00645 0.766 -0.0111 -0.0233
(0.701) (10.62) (0.882) (0.106) (0.0521) (0.448) (0.0364) (0.643)
Mancanha 0.0806 1.637 0.0176 0.0119 0.00523 -0.143 0.0320 -0.0365
(0.651) (9.799) (0.666) (0.0873) (0.0390) (0.228) (0.0216) (0.488)
Mandinga 0.193 4.095 -0.701 -0.0986 0.0424 0.239 0.0136 0.439
(0.681) (10.30) (0.868) (0.112) (0.0480) (0.338) (0.0333) (0.603)
Papéis -0.230 -3.391 -1.010 -0.0522 -0.00645 -0.211 0.0221 -0.0662
(0.531) (7.965) (0.617) (0.0821) (0.0347) (0.210) (0.0183) (0.436)
Manjacos 0.679 10.51 -0.295 -0.0239 0.00359 -0.0714 0.0165 0.138
(0.529) (7.985) (0.620) (0.0982) (0.0354) (0.220) (0.0192) (0.443)
Other 0.430 6.204 0.405 0.00299 0.0683 0.0872 0.0192 0.790
(0.591) (8.923) (0.666) (0.0901) (0.0384) (0.273) (0.0253) (0.486)
Observations 1009 1009 929 931 1009 856 935 1009
R2 0.049 0.050 0.038 0.273 0.058 0.056 0.078 0.055
F 1.967 2.034 1.503 9.470 2.561 1.147 2.872 2.413
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.8 – Socio-demographics, Social Relations Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inactivity Dummy Drop-out Dummy Active Now Dummy
Age -0.0904 -0.0944 -0.0956 -0.0951 0.0943 0.0997
(0.0675) (0.0708) (0.0702) (0.0741) (0.0671) (0.0699)
Age Squared 0.00125 0.00132 0.00124 0.00123 -0.00134 -0.00145
(0.00116) (0.00122) (0.00121) (0.00129) (0.00115) (0.00121)
Marital Status (Single) -0.174 -0.147 -0.272 -0.248 0.117 0.0906
(0.181) (0.185) (0.188) (0.192) (0.185) (0.188)
Sex (Female) 0.159 0.151 0.0263 0.0244 -0.0840 -0.0671
(0.0977) (0.101) (0.103) (0.108) (0.0987) (0.102)
Education Level 0.0860∗ 0.0892∗ 0.0879∗ 0.0881∗ -0.0753∗ -0.0790∗
(0.0354) (0.0364) (0.0374) (0.0384) (0.0357) (0.0366)
Dummy for any leadership position 0.0407 0.00438 0.0715 0.0822 0.00790 -0.0232
(0.101) (0.142) (0.107) (0.146) (0.103) (0.146)
Employment Status: Unemployed 0.452∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.106) (0.110) (0.113) (0.104) (0.106)
Owning a small retailing business 0.335∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.360∗ 0.370∗∗ -0.296∗ -0.309∗
(0.132) (0.133) (0.140) (0.140) (0.134) (0.134)
Asset Index=2 0.184 0.191 0.182 0.172 -0.130 -0.133
(0.131) (0.133) (0.141) (0.142) (0.132) (0.134)
Asset Index=3 0.247 0.274∗ 0.351∗ 0.374∗∗ -0.233 -0.257
(0.132) (0.134) (0.138) (0.141) (0.132) (0.135)
Asset Index=4 0.292∗ 0.349∗∗ 0.332∗ 0.371∗∗ -0.246 -0.298∗
(0.132) (0.132) (0.138) (0.139) (0.133) (0.133)
Volunteer in the family 0.194 0.195 -0.221
(0.116) (0.122) (0.117)
Number of activities 0.0690 0.0610 -0.0629
(0.0398) (0.0417) (0.0405)
Number of appointments 0.0447 0.00188 -0.00691
(0.0588) (0.0627) (0.0606)
Appointment Dummy -0.102 -0.0537 0.0665
(0.252) (0.255) (0.249)
Social participation Dummy -0.483∗∗ -0.438∗ 0.474∗∗
(0.163) (0.172) (0.164)
Volunteer 0.139 0.0574 -0.121
(0.238) (0.241) (0.236)
Talks with leaders(7 days) -0.0931 -0.0340 0.104
(0.0594) (0.0626) (0.0602)
Talking with leader dummy -0.0284 -0.0427 -0.0526
(0.175) (0.187) (0.177)
Observations 1010 1006 1010 1006 1010 1006
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.064 0.050 0.063 0.036 0.053
LR chi2 50.638 69.238 49.576 60.136 38.904 56.324
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.9 – Motivation, Ethnicity Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inactivity Dummy Drop-out Dummy Active Now Dummy
main
Willingness to have a positive pro-social impact 0.0226 0.0375 -0.0226
(0.0215) (0.0232) (0.0217)
Affective involvement with beneficiaries 0.0794 0.0164 -0.0785
(0.0805) (0.0797) (0.0819)
Extrinsic Motivation -0.0222∗ -0.0242∗ 0.0236∗
(0.00979) (0.0104) (0.00978)
Perceived negative social impact 0.00431 -0.00682 -0.00361
(0.0267) (0.0283) (0.0268)
Perceived pro-social impact -0.0709 -0.0276 0.0606
(0.0530) (0.0550) (0.0541)
Perceived Social Impact -0.0627 -0.0526 0.0619
(0.0508) (0.0531) (0.0512)
Pro-social Motivation(based on pleasure) 0.0119 0.00654 -0.0113
(0.0230) (0.0245) (0.0233)
Perception of the significance of the task -0.0480 -0.0513 0.0526
(0.0347) (0.0361) (0.0353)
Perceived Social Value 0.0312 0.0202 -0.0230
(0.0574) (0.0602) (0.0577)
Age -0.0834 -0.0920 -0.0934 -0.101 0.0875 0.0964
(0.0677) (0.0667) (0.0707) (0.0695) (0.0673) (0.0661)
Age Squared 0.00113 0.00125 0.00121 0.00132 -0.00122 -0.00134
(0.00116) (0.00114) (0.00122) (0.00120) (0.00115) (0.00113)
Marital Status (Single) -0.197 -0.171 -0.292 -0.272 0.138 0.111
(0.187) (0.181) (0.192) (0.190) (0.190) (0.185)
Sex (Female) 0.184 0.168 0.0673 0.0306 -0.112 -0.0968
(0.101) (0.0976) (0.107) (0.103) (0.102) (0.0986)
Education Level 0.0762∗ 0.0876∗ 0.0800∗ 0.0884∗ -0.0646 -0.0772∗
(0.0361) (0.0353) (0.0384) (0.0374) (0.0364) (0.0357)
Dummy for any leadership position 0.0809 0.0274 0.116 0.0635 -0.0346 0.0216
(0.103) (0.102) (0.109) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103)
Employment Status: Unemployed 0.457∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.104) (0.111) (0.111) (0.105) (0.105)
Fula 0.130 0.0491 -0.0874
(0.242) (0.252) (0.246)
Mancanha 0.139 0.103 -0.133
(0.187) (0.192) (0.188)
Mandinga 0.380 0.0930 -0.315
(0.235) (0.252) (0.239)
Papéis 0.309 0.235 -0.337∗
(0.159) (0.161) (0.159)
Manjacos 0.128 -0.0969 0.00683
(0.171) (0.181) (0.178)
Other 0.123 -0.128 -0.0234
(0.187) (0.204) (0.192)
Observations 1010 1009 1010 1009 1010 1009
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.051 0.066 0.057 0.058 0.044
LR chi2 71.103 57.176 64.512 57.752 60.210 48.176
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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